00:04[APPLAUSE]
>> Thank you.
00:07Please if you can go for the far seat.
00:09>> [APPLAUSE]
>> It's an absolute honor
00:16to have you here, and if you don't mind we
want to take you back in time a little bit
00:20and ask about your time or your thinking
straight out of business school.
00:24So we were very lucky to get
enrolled into this program and
00:26we got two years to add
value to ourselves.
00:29But most importantly we
are encouraged to take time off to
00:33reflect on our career choices and what
it is that we want to do after school.
00:37Naturally we are very,
very confused at this point.
00:39Take that advice to heart.
00:40So how intentional were you about your
career coming out of business school?
00:44>> I would tell you, I was sort of
an accidental investment banker and
00:52And a matter of fact,
when I was recruiting at Goldman Sachs,
00:57I was always very suspicious
of students who said they
01:00came out of their mother's womb knowing
they wanted to be an investment banker.
01:05So to step back,
you won't hear many stories like mine,
01:10because I was an English
major at Dartmouth.
01:15I went there thinking I wanted
to be a forest ranger or
01:17work somehow in conservation.
01:20I was going to go to Oxford.
01:22I had a rental scholarship.
01:23I was going to study English.
01:25But I had a very low draft number.
01:28And I could get into the ROTC at Harvard.
01:32And so I went to Harvard Business School.
01:35I just turned 22,
I hardly knew what business was.
01:39In those days, if you were a good
student in an Ivy League School,
01:43you didn't admit you wanted
to go into business.
01:45So when I told some of my friends I was
going to business school they almost
01:52So I went with no business experience,
01:58and I got to Harvard and
I'd been a very serious student.
02:05And I worked hard in college, but
everybody seemed so much older.
02:10You know, they were 27 or 28.
02:12Some of them were married,
and I was dating my wife,
02:17Wendy, who was at Wellesley.
02:18So I was out at Wellesley really
more than I was at business school.
02:22And so
I didn't even know what an investment
02:27banker was, and I certainly wouldn't have
02:33said I wanted to be an investment banker.
02:38I did a lot of work in one of
the professor's classes, and
02:42he had worked in the Pentagon.
02:47And so there is this small group,
02:50this analysis group that McNamara
had started when he was there.
02:55And I got asked one day whether I
want to interview for this group.
03:02And since I was going to
go in the Navy anyway,
03:07then this meant I wasn't going to
have to go on my Navy cruise and
03:10I could be with my wife to be and so on.
03:15It seemed like a pretty good deal.
03:17And it turns out that this group,
there were six people,
03:23four of us went on to become CEOs.
03:26One was Steve Hadley who became the
national security advisor to George Bush.
03:32Another was John Sprat who was
a couple years older who became
03:36Chairman of
the House Financial Services Committee.
03:38So it was an interesting
group to work with..
03:43So that's how my career took shape.
03:47>> So
you actually came out of business school,
03:49you took the two public office positions,
Department of Defense and
03:52then followed by
the President Nixon's administration.
03:55>From the outside it looked like
you had it all figured out and
03:58you were well on the way to
getting a Senate seat [LAUGH].
04:00>> No, I did not have it all figured out,
and I never worked in business.
04:08So I wore a suit on special
occasions to go to church.
04:12I never worked in business.
04:15And so I got there to this analysis group,
and I learned a lot when I was there.
04:24It's amazing how much I
learned because I have this
04:29view that it's not just
coming up with a right idea.
04:34Everybody can learn the computational
skills, analytical skills and so on.
04:40But it's the people skills that matter.
04:42>> So why the shift into Goldman Sachs?
04:45>> Well, I would say this.
04:46You're moving faster than I.
04:49>> [LAUGH]
>> Because literally, what I learned when
04:53I was there was I didn't know
what the word mentor was.
05:00But I found that when I would work for
five or
05:03six different people and on different
assignments, so I did the same work.
05:09And some really appreciated my skills and
others didn't.
05:13Some gave me the help I needed,
others didn't.
05:16And one of the things I worked on,
I worked on my first bail-out there,
05:20It was the Lockheed failure and
the Lockheed loan guarantee.
05:25So I had a chance to do that, and I got
to see how the political process worked.
05:32And as a result of that
John Connolly had introduced
05:37me to some people in the White House
who wanted me to go there.
05:46that almost as important as what I was
doing was who I was doing it with.
05:51It really made a big difference.
05:52So I interviewed all of the six different
directors of the Domestic Council, and
05:57I picked the guy that maybe
the least interesting work
06:00was going to be under him.
06:02But I thought I would
learn a lot from him.
06:04And then it turned out I got to work
on something I was very interested in,
06:09minimum wage, tax policy,
I was the liaison for Treasury.
06:14And so one of the things I
learned was that it was fun for
06:20me to work on financial problems.
06:23And that's why I decided
on investment banking.
06:31And even investment banking
06:36was accidental because I knew I
06:41didn't want to work in New York.
06:46So I talked to regional investment banks,
and it was only when I had a job
06:51offer from a company called
William Blair where the CEO said,
06:55yeah we'd like to have you come here but
you're very aggressive, ambitious.
07:00We don't think you'll be
happy with a regional firm.
07:03Why don't you talk to Goldman Sachs and
Saloman Brothers?
07:07And with Goldman Sachs,
07:09they rank like number ten in
the league tables in those days.
07:14And I ended up talking with a few
other firms, Morgan Stanley,
07:18White Weld, so on, but I really
liked the people at Goldman Sachs.
07:23I met people like Bob Rubin and
Steve Freedman and
07:27a whole bunch of names you wouldn't know,
but they were.
07:30>> [LAUGH]
>> People weren't there, but
07:34So I just basically said,
I feel comfortable with the culture.
07:38And I learned that almost as important
as what you do, is who you do it with.
07:44But if you had asked me out of college,
was I going to be an investment banker,
07:48I couldn't have told you what
an investment banker was.
07:51And in business school when I was
there The hot thing in those days,
07:56when I graduated from
Harvard Business School, let me say,
08:00the first two years I was at Goldman
Sachs, they lost money in '73 and '74.
08:05That people weren't going to investment
banks out of business school,
08:10they all wanted to go to Mackenzie or BCG.
08:14And the hottest thing was Hilton Head.
08:16You know, Sea Pines,
real estate development.
08:19You pictured people lighting
cigars with hundred dollar bills.
08:22so, wherever the students
wanted to go that was all,
08:25just about before it would blow up,
that's where they wanted to go.
08:28>> [LAUGH]
>> So, 32 years later, you made the exact
08:33opposite transition going into public
office as the Secretary of Treasury.
08:40So can you walk us through how you made
that decision and how were you a different
08:43person then than the person who
went into finance 32 years ago?
08:46>> Yeah, but again, brevity may not be
one of my virtues but will say this.
08:54That when you went to Goldman Sachs,
and you went into investment banking,
08:59you didn't go because you
wanted to run something,
09:01you wanted to work with clients, okay?
09:04If you wanted to run something,
you went to work for a real company.
09:07So I had no interest in running something,
I wanted to work with clients.
09:13And so again I'm just saying
this in terms of career advice
09:17because I am suspicious
of career engineers.
09:21People that plan it out
every step of the way.
09:24And I'd had people come up to me at
all the time at Goldman Sachs and
09:27say Hank, should I do arbitrage or
should I do
09:34private equity or
should I be doing corporate finance?
09:37And I'd say, what is it you like,
what is it you're going to do well?
09:42And so I only wanted to work with clients.
09:47And so
I was in Chicago working with clients and
09:52was really focused on
a wide range of clients.
09:55I turned down a variety of promotions,
I stayed in Chicago.
10:01When finally they put me on
the management committee,
10:04I ended up starting a private
equity division from Chicago.
10:09Co-heading investment banking
from Chicago and getting
10:14Asia in my portfolio because my partner
in New York said he wanted Europe and
10:19he said, Asia's closer to Chicago.
10:23>> [LAUGH]
>> So that's how, and I did.
10:27So my career took a whole lot of,
10:30only as time went on that I
learned that I enjoyed managing.
10:36And then only when we had
Bob Rubin went to run,
10:41went to work for Bill Clinton in
the White House and then Treasury.
10:49And his co-head had a physical problem and
10:52had to leave at the same time
Goldman Sachs had trading losses.
10:56And I was in Chicago and
10:57the management committee had to
pick the next management team.
11:00I told my wife it's going to happen over
the weekend, don't worry, I'll come back.
11:04And Goldman Sachs had losses and
I had to have her send a couple suits.
11:10I had to go buy stuff, I stayed there.
11:13And I told her, I would just do this for
two years and it was a rolling two years.
11:17I was there for 12 years.
11:20I tell that story to say that if I think
I had said I want to run Goldman Sachs,
11:26I would have come in and I don't think
I would ever want to run Goldman Sachs.
11:30I just focused on doing what
I was doing in front of me.
11:34Enjoying it, learning and growing.
11:37Now in terms of, boy, being Secretary
of the Treasury, it was interesting.
11:46I sit in this group because I
think back to 2006 because I
11:51had agreed to be a speaker at
Harvard Business School and
11:56I had agreed to do that long before
I thought I'd be Treasury Secretary.
12:04And so
I was standing up talking to students
12:07knowing that I was going to
be Treasury Secretary.
12:10And I remember thinking, I use to go and
recruit all the time, and
12:14I would say to people, you know,
the world is changing quickly.
12:18The pace of change is increasing,
12:21embrace change,
change is your friend, etc, etc.
12:26And I was thinking, my stomach was
churning as I was thinking about that
12:29change, and thinking my God,
I'm going to have to eat my own cooking.
12:32Because we all say we like change,
but we hate change, really.
12:36>> [LAUGH]
>> It's a difficult thing.
12:38And so as I was running Goldman Sachs,
I enjoyed it.
12:46I thought I was doing it well and
so when I got the first approach
12:51from the White House,
I immediately turned it down.
12:56I had a wife and a mother and two kids who
13:01were very, did not favor George Bush.
13:11>> And so I turned it down and
13:15then they came back a second time.
13:21This was when I did a lot
of work with China, and
13:26so Hu Jintao,
who was the President of China,
13:29was going to be at the White House
sometime in the spring of 2006.
13:33And I was asked, they didn't want to
give the Chinese a state dinner so
13:36they gave them a state lunch
if you can believe that.
13:39So I was asked for the state lunch and
I was asked to have dinner or
13:44meet with George Bush in
the residence beforehand.
13:47When I do that and I'd agreed to do it and
13:49then as the time got closer I said I can't
do that, I can't turn down the president.
13:53I'm not going to leave Goldman Sachs and
join the administration.
13:55So I blew it off at the last minute.
13:57>> [LAUGH]
>> And so, I went into the White House for
14:02the lunch and everybody was sort
of a little bit cool to me.
14:07And as I was walking out with Wendy
it was a beautiful spring day and
14:11I was looking at the Treasury Building and
14:14I thought back to the days when I
was in the White House as a kid and
14:18I'd go over and meet with
George Schultz when he was at Treasury.
14:23And sort of a cloud came over my face and
14:25Wendy said to me, well I hope you
didn't turn it down for me, sweetie,
14:31because if it was really important
to you I would have agreed to do it.
14:35And I said no, no, no.
14:37And then when they came back the third
time I just realized that it was
14:43I realized that I knew I could do
a good job as Treasury Secretary.
14:47I couldn't think of many people that had
gone from business to government and
14:52come back, left with a higher
reputation than they'd come with.
14:56And so as soon as I realized that,
I said, we'll,
14:59I'm not going to give into that and
I accepted.
15:02And, my family was in shock for awhile.
15:05My mother said to me, by gosh,
you started off working for Nixon and
15:09you're going to now finish working for
Bush.
15:11You should be ashamed of yourself.
15:13>> [LAUGH]
>> So, I cried.
15:17And they all decided as I did
that they had great respect and
15:21liked when they saw how he worked with me.
15:24And I had great respect for him,
and it was a real pleasure.
15:27But so I tell you that in more detail,
do you see how some of these decisions.
15:31It's not like I said now I'm
going to go to Goldman Sachs and
15:33now be Treasury Secretary.
15:35Things just worked out.
15:37>> But my mother was not a big
fan of George Bush's vote and
15:40this actually makes me feel much better,
and
15:45I'm sure it does all of you, about not
having that strong of a plan coming up.
15:48So hopefully this will work out well.
15:51The next question I want to ask
is You stated several times that
15:56the work-life balance is
very important to you.
15:58And we are trying one
of the main skills or
16:01core skills we're trying to gain is the
ability to influence large institution.
16:05Now the cutthroat environment,
100 hour plus work weeks at Goldman Sachs,
16:10are to some extent in contradiction
with the work-life balance that you've
16:15stated several times that you value.
16:17So when you were rising through the ranks
and eventually running the organization,
16:22how did you think about managing or
influencing that culture?
16:25>> I'll tell you another
story because then,
16:30I think it was 1999 after we went public.
16:35I had a nephew who was graduating
from Kellogg Business School.
16:39So, I was the speaker there and
my speech was on work-life balance.
16:43And so, I told the story,
which was absolutely true,
16:48that I was in the Chicago
office of Goldman Sachs and
16:53I had a three year old and
a one year old and I was working hard,
16:59coming home late and my wife Wendy said
to me, Hank, this is unacceptable.
17:07And you either are going to come home and
17:11take an active part in raising the kids or
you're going to come
17:16home some night and the kids are still
going to be here and I'm going to be gone.
17:21>> [LAUGH]
>> And so, I went to my boss and
17:25I said I really need to
do something differently.
17:30I really do and
I was off to a very good start.
17:34And so he said, look it,
you do what you need to do.
17:38So my office was on the 60th
floor of the Sears Tower, and
17:42if you can believe this, I would run
at 4:30 from there to get the 4:42
17:47train from the Chicago Northwestern
to Barrington, Illinois.
17:53I was home at quarter of six.
17:56I would give the kids dinner.
18:00I'd give them a bath and
I'd read the goodnight story.
18:04And I'd be reading In the Great Green Room
with the Red Balloon, Goodnight, Moon.
18:08I'd be going through this.
18:09>> [LAUGH]
>> And so, I do not read with expression
18:12and so once Wendy came in,
if you've heard me read a speech,
18:17you know it's not a very
pleasant thing to listen to.
18:20>> [LAUGH]
>> And so Wendy came in and she says,
18:23slow down, read with expression.
18:26When I did that the kids both
started crying and said,
18:29no, read like a daddy not like a mommy.
18:34I told that story to
the Kellogg Graduating Class.
18:42It was the same way, everybody laughed and
particularly the women, they loved it.
18:46And the mothers loved it,
and they all liked me.
18:49And I walked out and
there was a competitive partner at
18:53Salomon Brothers at the time,
named J Ira Harris.
18:57And he said, you hypocrite.
18:59You're standing up there,
giving that speech and
19:03then you just work the living daylights
out of the kids at Goldman Sachs.
19:08How can you do this?
19:09Where does this come from?
19:11And I said well, I would just tell
you what I say to everybody that
19:16came to me for advice at Goldman Sachs.
19:20I said, you can't ask the firm to
19:24tell you how many hours
a week you're going to work.
19:26If you're working 50 how about 55,
60 how about 65?
19:33You have to learn to say no.
19:35You have to plan your own life.
19:38And that the people spend so
much time on their career and
19:44so little relative time on their family.
19:48And you just get out of it,
what you invest in it.
19:51And you can't be a grunt.
19:54Think people need to be very careful.
19:57You need to do things you enjoy and
that you're going to do well.
20:00And if the only way you can do well is
working more hours than someone else,
20:04you're going to lose out,
20:05because there's always going to be
someone else who's going to work more.
20:08And so you need to find something and
20:13you need to work to have
a life away from the job.
20:21And I can tell you this,
I know everybody has said this to you,
20:24but I can assure you this is this case,
probably the one thing I've done more
20:29than anyone else who has ever run
a Wall Street firm is work with clients.
20:34Because I worked from all the way
up in investment banking, and
20:39when I ran Goldman Sachs,
I still advised CEOs.
20:42And I handled clients,
because I thought that was important.
20:45I worked with heads of state,
I advised them.
20:47I advised the president of China,
Germany CEOs.
20:53I've worked with many, many of them that
have been successful professionally.
20:57I've worked with many, many people that
didn't get where they thought they were
21:01going to get and retired,
and came to me for advice.
21:04And I know of many, many people that
didn't quite get to where they wanted to
21:09get with their career, and they're happy.
21:12They're happy and they're well-balanced.
21:14I don't know anyone that says,
boy, I had a great career and
21:18I'm happy because I screwed up my life
outside of my career, my family life.
21:23There's no one that feels that way.
21:28And I take it to the point
where I encourage people to do
21:31things also In the not-for-profit area.
21:35When I ran Goldman Sachs,
I chaired the Nature Conservancy.
21:38I chaired the Peregrine Fund.
21:40I encouraged people to do these things.
21:44It makes you better at your career.
21:46It's not easy and don't expect
your bosses to take care of it.
21:54I think you need to take care of it.
21:56You need to get yourself in
a situation where you can balance it.
22:01It is really, really important,
really important.
22:05And you know, it's tricky.
22:09>> We have some class members
who got offers already, so
22:11I hope they can pull this off.
22:13>> [LAUGH] Moving forward to the point
when you became the Secretary of Treasury,
22:18you've stated before that you identified
specific risks that the financial system
22:23was running,
specific financial industries and
22:26you've actually pointed it out to
President Bush well before the crises.
22:31One of the core skills we're trying to
gain out of our experience here is how to
22:36think and strategize in a preventive
manner to avoid crises.
22:41So what did you do between the years of
2006 and 2008 to implement that change?
22:46And for example, would it have been
possible to implement something like
22:51the Dodd-Frank Act earlier or
maybe in 2006,
22:54rather than only implement
it after hell broke loose?
22:57>> In 2006, after I became
Treasury Secretary of the President,
23:02my first meeting he took
the economic team to Camp David.
23:06And I was asked to talk about
entitlements, because that was one of
23:10the reasons that I was coming down
was to work on entitlement reform.
23:15And I said no,
I'd like to speak about financial crises,
23:18because I'd been through one in '94 and
'98 and I saw excesses in the system.
23:23Now, I saw nothing like
the one we had coming.
23:27And when the President said to me,
what will cause it?
23:32I said, I don't know.
23:35Afterwards, it'll be clear, people with
20/20 hindsight will say it's obvious and
23:40there will always be someone
that says I predicted it, but
23:43that person won't predict the next one.
23:46Okay, because they're unpredictable
in terms of the timing and the cause.
23:53>> If you don't mind me interrupting,
we're of the shelf.
23:55The derivatives and credit default swaps
not apparently toxic at that point.
24:00>> Yeah, so what I did when I came down.
24:03He said, what might cause it?
24:05I talked about credit default swaps.
24:07I talked about a huge problem I saw,
24:09which we were working with Tim Geithner
at the New York Fed to clean up.
24:14Where there just, I won't go into it, but
24:17there's a very big technical
problem with credit default swaps.
24:21I thought the hedge funds, hedge
fund's connectivity to banks, I didn't
24:26look at, say, mortgages, I knew there
were some issues with subprime.
24:31But the idea that the whole
housing marking would drop.
24:35We'd been looking at, I was born in 1946,
and ever since World War II,
24:42if you bought a diversified
portfolio of residential mortgages
24:48the only risk you had was you
got your money back too soon.
24:54Because there was no nationwide
decline of housing prices,
24:58it was a commercial mortgage market.
25:00And so we didn't see that,
we didn't see the money market.
25:04But the advantage of having said that was,
the huge advantage to me, was
25:11I had a year to build the relationships
we needed to build before the crisis.
25:15We couldn't,
the horse was already out of the barn,
25:18there were, the excesses were there.
25:23But I had a year where we had something
25:26called the President's working
group on financial markets.
25:29So then I started working
with Ben Bernanke and
25:33Tim Geithner, and
we didn't uncover the problems.
25:38We never thought about money markets,
or the tri-party repo market, but
25:42we did a lot of work together, and
we built strong relationships.
25:45And then most important of all,
25:47I had a chance to build a relationship
with George Bush, because,
25:52if there's any point I want to
make to you all, it's all about
25:57interpersonal relationships,
it's all about working with others.
26:03Getting anything done that's
important requires that.
26:06I had negotiated quite a deal
when I came to the white house,
26:10because I got turned down several
times when I came to Treasury.
26:13And so that I could make all
the appointments, regardless of political
26:18party, at treasury,
that I'd be their primary spokesman and
26:22adviser on domestic and economic issues,
how things would be staffed.
26:26But I realized when I got there
that no matter what I negotiated,
26:30if it didn't work between me and
the President the whole thing wasn't
26:35going to work, and
it would be my fault and not his.
26:38And I'd been trained as
an investment banker.
26:41I wasn't running a big firm
where people gave orders, I was,
26:45I had to get down on my knees and
26:46persuade certain partners to stay, most of
them thought they were smarter than I was.
26:51I had learned to work with clients, so
26:55I could run a firm and advise a principal.
26:59So I knew how to do that, and
27:02so I had an opportunity to build a very
close relationship with the President,
27:07a relationship of trust before
the crisis hit, and with Congress.
27:11So that was a key, and
27:13that was one of the benefits of getting
ready, but we certainly didn't.
27:19If I had been omniscient, and
I'd known exactly what was happening,
27:25I couldn't have got
the powers a day earlier.
27:26Because I started working in Fannie and
Freddie in 2006.
27:29It just it took a crisis to get
what we needed from Congress.
27:34>> TARP was labeled as as
the bailout of the guilty rich,
27:40at the expense of taxpayer money.
27:44So that was a very tough decision for
you to make, of course.
27:48But how did you think
about public messaging?
27:51Did you try to gain support, or
at least understanding of the necessity
27:55of the decision by the public,
and how did that go?
27:58>> So it's a very interesting thing.
28:00When I left Treasury,
there was a poll that showed, and
28:05I don't remember the numbers
exactly right, but
28:09something like 90% of the people
were against TARP, and
28:1460% or 70% were against torture.
28:17And yet, a big part of
the population was also scared to
28:22death we were going to
have a financial crisis.
28:26So I was never successful, that was one
of the big failings of letting people
28:31know what we did was for
the American people.
28:35It wasn't for Wall Street, and
28:41I think most people to this day still
don't know that all the money we
28:46put in that, when I left the programs
accounted for 95% of their programs,
28:51the programs accounted for 90% of
the TARP dollars that were in place and
28:5575% of the dollars were
already out the door.
28:58And the money we put into banks and
insurance companies all came back,
29:03plus just about $50 billion.
29:05And it prevented a disaster,
but you don't get credit for
29:11a disaster that people don't see.
29:14When we went in and asked for the TARP,
29:21and painted the picture of
the economy was turning way down.
29:26It was going to get much worse a number
of months out no matter what we did.
29:31Barney Frank said to me,
29:32Barney Frank was chairman of the House
Financial Services Committee, he said,
29:35Hank this is going to be very difficult
because you can't prove a counterfactual.
29:40And that was at midnight, and
I said what's a counterfactual?
29:42And he said,
well you're not going to get credit for,
29:45you know people are going to be very angry
because they're going to be hurting, and
29:48you're not going to get credit for
saving a disaster they didn't see.
29:53But the biggest thing we did
with TARP that was unpopular,
29:59was people wanted to punish the banks, and
30:05they wanted us to be tougher on the banks.
30:08And we did something with TARP that
was never been done before, was
30:15extraordinarily innovative, and I don't
think people to this day understand it.
30:20Which is when we switched,
which is another story, when
30:26I went to congress and said we're not
going to put capital in the banks.
30:32We are going to buy a liquid assets.
30:35And the reason I did that was, only time
I'd ever seen capital go in the banks,
30:40had been when they were nationalized.
30:43So bank is ready to fail, you nationalize
them, you're very tough on them, right?
30:47That's what you do with.
30:47That's we did with Fannie and Freddie.
30:49That's what the Europeans did,
you know, the British,
30:52they only put capital in two banks.
30:54They nationalized,
the Europeans, a handful.
30:57So I thought we needed to
recapitalize the system.
31:01And I had a theory about
buying liquid assets.
31:05But I told Barney Frank,
we need the authority to put capital in,
31:08because I thought we might
have to nationalize a few.
31:12So, when we got the, but
31:14the two weeks we were up in Congress,
the world seemed to change.
31:20Wachovia went down, Wamu went down,
the Europeans had to bail out their banks.
31:26So I went to George Bush, and
31:29I would say you're in a crisis,
you're dealing with big,
31:34ugly problems, there are not going to
be elegant, perfect solutions.
31:37So you gotta make decisions, and if you're
wrong, you gotta be willing to change.
31:41So I went and I said, guess what, it's not
going to work, buy your liquid assets.
31:46We have to put capital in banks.
31:47And he said, well, how are you going to
explain that to the whole world?
31:49I said, I don't know,
I'll just say, we made a mistake,
31:50we're going to put capital in the banks.
31:52And he said, good, do what you're
going to do to save the The economy.
31:57So, but then what we did was
we made attractive terms.
32:04Because we wanted to
recapitalize the banking system,
32:08and we put capital in 700 banks.
32:12So I chose stability over doing
what would be politically popular.
32:20>> And what about the misconceptions or
32:21the personal misconceptions when it came
to exaggerated bonuses, golden parachutes?
32:27Why not put something in place that
makes it very clear to the people that
32:31individuals within those
institutions are not benefiting?
32:34>> You're right, that of all the things,
well first of all, if we'd done that,
32:39if we had put all those conditions on, we
could have easily put those conditions on.
32:46And we did more than that when you
look at AIG or Fannie and Freddie.
32:53But if I'd done that,
then every bank is the tallest midget.
32:57They don't need capital
until they're ready to fail.
33:00And you just would have had
a number of serial failures.
33:03So what we did,
we put in a number of provisions, and
33:08we put in a provision on parachutes,
okay, but not bonuses.
33:14If we said we're going to determine how
you pay people, then many banks would say,
33:18well we're not going to fail.
33:19But we recapitalized the banking system.
33:22So it was very unpopular, but
look at where we are relative to Europe.
33:26The governments are bailing out the banks
which is bailing out the government
33:31Our banks were recapitalized.
33:34And that put everything in
place that was needed for
33:39the stress test and for
recapitalizing the banking system.
33:43But you're totally right.
33:44And of all the things that bothered me,
and
33:47I thought was egregious, I just thought it
was so beyond the pale, was those bonuses.
33:54Because after the fact, bankers didn't
have to say we've done anything wrong.
34:01They just have to say,
thank you to the United States of America.
34:05What was done saved the system,
even if our bank might not have gone down,
34:09which they all might have said.
34:11And so we are going to show
some self awareness and
34:16sense of decency and so on.
34:20So I sat there dying watching the bonuses,
but
34:23there weren't requirements and
I would do the same thing all over again.
34:29I tell you that's why we recovered so
quickly and
34:32why it worked, and the capital came back,
but people are angry.
34:37>> Thank you very much for that.
34:39You've been very accomplished.
34:41You've actually accomplished more than any
of us could wish to on several fronts.
34:46And after all of that,
34:47you decided to dedicate the rest of your
life to the work at the Paulson Institute.
34:50So what is it about the US-China
future collaboration that you place so
34:54much value on, and
are there any specific opportunities or
34:58sectors that you think we
should keep an eye on?
35:03>> Well, I would say this, first of all,
as I look around here at you all.
35:09Because you're here, we're all similar.
35:14We all want to make a difference, right?
35:17We all want to have a rich personal life.
35:20We want to do something professionally
where we make a difference.
35:24And my theory is always you need to say,
in today's world
35:30where there's so many talented people,
where do I have a comparative advantage?
35:35Where do I have the greatest chance
to make a difference where there's
35:40an intersection of something that I can
do well, and something that I enjoy?
35:45Okay, so two things happened
over the course of my career.
35:51One of them was serendipitously,
I got to Asia.
35:56I got there at the right time,
I met the Chinese leaders and I was there.
36:03And I would just say if you're interested,
my Chinese version of my book came out.
36:09Dealing with China,
which is the book I wrote.
36:11I wrote the first one on the crisis
was On the Brink, Dealing with China.
36:15The first third of the book is
about investment banking in China
36:24bringing how capital markets transactions
brought western know-how and
36:29capital, that the leaders used to
open up the country to competition.
36:35It really revived my career.
36:37I would've left Goldman Sachs.
36:38I was interested in maybe
doing some other things, and
36:42I worked on the first big public
offering for China Mobile privatization,
36:48then PetroChina,
then the first bank deal, Bank of China.
36:52So I worked alongside of people that
if you were to name the people,
36:59the guy who runs the Central Bank,
the Minister of Finance Lou Jiwei,
37:04Zhou Xiaochuan, the Central Bank,
Wang Qishan who
37:06now runs a big interdisciplinary committee
and who's on the standing committee.
37:11I worked with these people.
37:14President Xi Jinping, when I set up
the strategic economic dialogue,
37:19which I did as treasury secretary with
China, I've actually visited him in
37:24Hangzhou before I went to see the others,
the leaders in Beijing.
37:28And so I helped him plan, when Xi Jinping
visited the West Coast last September,
37:35he asked me to get together a group of
CEOs to moderate a discussion with him.
37:41So I know these people, so
I said I can make a difference there.
37:45And I always cared about conservation.
37:47Jim Morgan and
I worked on the Asia-Pacific Council of
37:52the Nature Conservancy, so my wife got
me involved in the Nature Conservancy.
37:59I worked in saving parks,
setting up parks in Hunan in China.
38:03So I've always cared about conservation.
38:06I've cared about the environment.
38:07And so if you care about the global
ecosystem, if you think climate
38:12change is the biggest economic
risk by far we face in the world,
38:17and you want to do something about it,
guess what?
38:21China's the place to be,
38:22because if they don't make progress
nothing else we do makes much difference.
38:27And so I basically said, I care about the
environment, I care about conservation.
38:34I've made enough money.
38:35I don't need to make more money,
I'm going to do an NGO.
38:37So I set up the Paulson Institute.
38:40And also, the Nature Conservancy asked me
to do for them what I've done in China,
38:44which I set up the Latin American Council
of the Nature Conservancy.
38:50So I got back from China on Saturday and
on the 9th, I'm going to Oaxaca,
38:54Mexico where we're going to have our
meeting with the Nature Conservancy.
38:58And so
I work with business because in China,
39:03I have a US-China CEO consul
on sustainable urbanization.
39:10So I go there with people like Tim Cook
from Apple and Doug MacMillon from
39:14Walmart and Ginny Rometty from IBM and
Mary Barrow from General Motors and
39:18we work with Jack Ma, Alibaba,
the State Grid construction companies.
39:23So we're doing the things that I
know how to do and I like to do.
39:28And I must like work, because I'm no
longer on a private plane going there,
39:35I'm on United Airlines, and-
>> [LAUGH]
39:39>> Thank you very much for that.
39:41>> And I mean I can do this,
39:42I'd love to do this for hours but
we're unfortunately out of time.
39:44So, one final question
before we move to Q&A.
39:48You and Wendy have been married for
just under 50 years.
39:51Myself and Donna, who's here with
us today, have been married for
39:54just under two months.
39:57[LAUGH] do you have any advice for us?
40:00I would say people always make jokes and
so on about this, but to me it's serious.
40:06And I think the key thing is,
40:09[COUGH] we got married when we were young,
and
40:14we grew together, and
we kept common interest.
40:20I've seen so many couples,
they get married and they grow apart.
40:27And so we've done all of our
conservation work together.
40:32We've done so much jointly,
she's helped me immensely in China.
40:37Many of our most important relationships
were ones that we both built.
40:43We were in, last Thursday,
it's the two of us,
40:48I was asking her,
please stay an extra day.
40:52Because we're going to have dinner
with Premiere Li Keqiang and his wife,
40:56Cheng Hong, and
she speaks beautiful English.
40:59She studied American nature writing,
41:04literature study, the transcendentalists,
Thoreau and Emerson.
41:09And so Wendy was there,
we had a workshop on wetlands
41:15conservation, and
Wendy was there doing that with me.
41:20So I think that the key is, you need to
find things that you can do together.
41:29Everybody talks about me as
being a bird watcher, okay?
41:32I like being outdoors, I really don't
like bird watching as much as Wendy does.
41:36>> [LAUGH]
>> But I do it because I've got bad eyes,
41:39I don't see them as well, but
I do it because I enjoy it and
41:43I'm doing it with her, and
so we find those things.
41:47And then the other thing I really
find that is terribly important is,
41:53when there are differences,
to talk about them and learn,
41:58the most important thing you
can learn is to say I'm sorry,
42:03even if you think its
the other person's fault.
42:07>> [LAUGH]
>> If you learn to say you’re sorry and
42:11just really learn to say you’re sorry.
42:15So, we would always, every week,
42:18no matter what,
no matter how busy I was at Treasury or
42:22whatever, we would go for
a long walk or a bike ride.
42:27And she tells the story of the time when
we were going for a bike ride at Treasury,
42:32when I was so, when my mind was elsewhere.
42:34I rode the bike right into a gate and
collapsed on the pavement, so.
42:40>> [LAUGH]
>> But these relationships you get out of,
42:45I will just say this to you.
42:48There is nothing, there's not a perfect
job, there's nothing that's perfect.
42:53There's, I've got as close to perfect
wife as you can have but nothing,
42:57no marriage,
anything is going to be perfect.
43:00You get out of it what you put into it,
and so you need to keep investing.
43:05And if you don't continue to invest in
your marriage, no matter how much you're
43:10in love now 10, 15, or
20 years from now you'll grow apart.
43:14So you just, it's just like anything else,
if you value it you will keep it.
43:21>> Well I'm sorry, and
[LAUGH] we'll move on to Q and A now.
43:29So when you're asking the question
please stand up and state your name.
43:34>> I wanted to ask what do you think
of the financial technology sector?
43:39And how do you think
that's going to evolve and
43:41change the relationship between banks and
consumers?
43:48>> What do you think of the evolution
of the financial technology center?
43:52And how do you think this will effect
the relationship between the banks and
43:58>> The evolution of what?
43:59>> The financial technology sector.
44:02>> The financial technology sector,
Fintech okay?
44:05[LAUGH]
>> Sorry about that.
44:10>> Okay, because I tell you,
44:13it's amazing what's going on and the time,
44:18and you look at what's going on in China,
with Alipay and so on.
44:26So it's extraordinary, and
44:28it is in China in particular,
where you don't
44:34have all the financial infrastructure
that we've got in other countries.
44:39It is growing, very, very quickly,
I think it's exciting.
44:44I think a paperless, if we ever get
to a paperless financial system,
44:54it will make a big difference
in terms of transparency and
44:58all kinds of other things
in terms of taxes.
45:03And I think the thing we
need to be careful about is,
45:08I learned and one of the lessons
from the financial crisis is,
45:14you can sometimes have too
much complexity or innovation.
45:19And one of the things that happened
before the financial crisis,
45:23is our financial system
outgrew our regulatory system.
45:27And so I do worry about regulation,
45:35transparency in places, and
I watch the money market funds.
45:42The scariest thing for me, and
the closest I could see to the financial
45:48crisis bleeding over from Wall Street to
Main Street was when we had three and
45:54a half or four trillion dollars worth
of money market funds imploding.
46:00And they're the ones that were
funding the commercial paper.
46:03So I was hearing from AAA companies saying
we can't sell our commercial paper,
46:08and we're not going to be able to even
make our quarterly dividend payment.
46:13And I could realize if they start paying
their suppliers, then it goes, it just
46:18goes, pretty soon it hits small industrial
companies and the whole system collapses.
46:23And so I think to make sure that this,
46:28what I call fintech doesn't grow so
46:33quickly, that it's unregulated.
46:38And we needed to make sure that
there's the right protections and
46:42the right liquidity, and so on.
46:45>> So if there's an app that controls your
entire portfolio at the click of a button,
46:50how would that affect
Goldman's Private Wealth Management Team?
46:53>> [LAUGH] I'll tell you, for
46:59a long time, I remember,
47:04and this'll date me.
47:09So you all were in primary school,
47:14but when we had the telecom
internet bubble burst,
47:22when I was at Goldman Sachs in about 2000.
47:28And the years running up to that
everybody was saying, well,
47:33how's the internet going to
change our business model?
47:37How's it going to
disintermediate what we do?
47:39And I remember then we tried
to set up a technology
47:44platform for a high net worth force.
47:49And I continue to believe that
47:54there are going to be a good number
of people that are going to want
47:59real Advice and real judgment and
customized, but there's
48:04a lot that needs to be done and can be
done more efficiently through technology.
48:09So, but that's the story,
the concern and what you
48:15all are going to deal with, we're dealing
with right now, is going to be a big,
48:20big factor in your business lifetimes
is the dark side of technology.
48:25It makes all of our lives better, we're
not going to turn back the clock, but
48:29I will tell you, when you look
at automation and technology and
48:33what's doing the labor markets, and
the number of people that are going to be.
48:39Anything that can be automated or
routinized, will be.
48:43what you're going to see is people at
the top are going to do very well.
48:47And there's going to be a lot
of people without jobs or
48:50without the jobs they want.
48:52And how we come up with a political system
that lets our democracy work and lets our
48:58economy continue to flourish, is going to
take a lot of interesting thought.
49:04And there's nothing you
need to be afraid of but
49:06that's another reason why it
comes back to my advice to you.
49:08You can afford anything other than not,
you need to keep learning and
49:12growing in any job you get and
get something that plays to your skill.
49:16It's going to take judgement and
take wisdom and they can't be,
49:21you're not going to be
disintermediated by technology.
49:26>> I think we have time for
one more question.
49:33>> Peter Stradling, thank you for
coming to talk to us.
49:36So I was just thinking about, given
the immediate reporting on the crisis in
49:40the book Too Big to Fail and the narrative
that both those things cultivated.
49:45Is there anything about this prevailing
narrative that you feel is fundamentally
49:49misunderstood or
you would want the public to know?
49:51You mentioned TARP and it's
implementation but are there other things?
49:55>> I would say that I think Too Big
to Fail got it largely right.
50:01If you want to read the narrative that got
it totally right, you'd read On the Brink,
50:06because that was a first hand account,
50:12and no one has been able to quarrel with
any fact in the book the way it's written.
50:21But I would say that the other thing
that people ask about all the time.
50:26When they say if you made major mistakes
and I say, well I think the major ones, we
50:32made a lot of mistakes, but the major ones
we corrected right on the battlefield.
50:36So, putting, reversing ourselves, putting
capital in the banks, or with Fanny or
50:42Freddie, I remember I said, if we had
unlimited authorities or unspecified
50:46I wouldn't have to take the bazooka out,
and I took it out when I had to.
50:51But, I would say, we still have
a surprising number of people,
50:56that despite the fact that Bernanke,
Geithner, and I are all generally regarded
51:00to be straight shooters, don't believe
us when they say, we didn't have any
51:04authority, legal authority,
that would have worked to save Lehman.
51:08And the fact is, but no one can tell
us what that authority was we had.
51:12Because, we couldn't,
we had no authority to,
51:17guaranteed debt, or to put in capital.
51:21And, what we learned when
Bear Stearns was going down,
51:25was a fed loan didn't work when
a bank was, frankly, unravelling.
51:32Everybody pulls their money and run,
and so we were fortunate enough to
51:36have a buyer there, JP Morgan and
it guaranteed the trading book.
51:41And so when Lehman went,
we had AIG, Lehman,
51:43and Merrill all going at the same time.
51:46And frankly, it was terrible but we got
the best possible outcome because if
51:53Lehman had been bought, then they
wouldn't have been anyone to buy Merrill.
51:58And Merrill was bigger and
they were going down immediately.
52:02And with AIG,
we lucked out because the perception
52:07with all us was there's this big
liquidity crisis at the holding company.
52:12Which was like a big hedge fund and the
underlying insurance companies which had
52:17individual credit ratings were money good.
52:20So the treasury could loan against
those and the market accepted it.
52:25But by the time the market figured out,
guess what,
52:27that wasn't the case, we now had
the tarp and we could put capital in.
52:32But at the end of the day, I realized
52:37that I've given up trying to explain
that because unless you were close to it
52:43you're not going to really
understand it that well anyway.
52:47And the fact is, bailouts shouldn't be,
the whole thing was unpopular,
52:54and I don't think bailouts should
ever be popular in the United States.
53:02And when people screw up,
if they take a risk and
53:07they succeed they should be rewarded and
if they fail they should fail.
53:10But the financial system is such that
if it goes under everybody pays.
53:16The only other thing, which I think
I wish people know and understood and
53:21I think this is quite important.
53:24Is that when there's a financial crisis
everybody always blames the banks.
53:30>From the beginning of times
banks get 100% of the blame.
53:34And banks make all kinds of mistakes and
so some good comes out of that.
53:39But the root cause of a financial
crisis is never the banks.
53:44Don't let anybody tell you it is,
it is flawed government policies, and
53:49I don't care what the political system is.
53:52Whenever you've got a big economy and
53:54you've got a banking system,
there'll be flawed government policies.
53:59They lead to excesses, excesses manifest
themselves in the banking system and
54:03there'll be failures.
54:06So the best you can hope for
54:08is to get to it before the excesses become
too great and have the tools you need.
54:13And so the Fintech question,
54:16the thing I'd be asking myself
all the time about Fintech,
54:21is everybody now is
focused on the big banks.
54:25But I think the problem is that
if you regulate them so much and
54:30turn them into utilities you
force the risk out elsewhere.
54:35And a lot of the risk was in
the tri-party repo system,
54:39was in the shadow banking market,
money markets and so on.
54:43And the basic risk comes in our financial
system because whatever the size is,
54:49I forgot what number is, 13, $14 trillion
or whatever, 60% of that is deposits.
54:56Okay, the rest is wholesale funding and
so you're always going to have risk.
55:02And so the problem is if you
just only blame the banks
55:09you get to this,
it's going really far in the US, but
55:13then you don't focus on
cleaning up the basic problems.
55:18What leads us to borrow too much,
save too little, okay,
55:23why don't we get around to fixing Fanny or
Freddy?
55:26If we have a vocal rule and
banks can't do market making and
55:31you got liquidity problems and you've got
interest rates that are almost zero and
55:37money is seeking out yield.
55:39You're going to have bubbles and what
about the bond funds and liquidity there?
55:43There's so again I'd say don't
just focus on the banks and
55:48don't ever believe that the banks
are the only problem because that'll
55:54just cause you to beat up on the banks and
we won't deal with the root causes.
56:00>> Thank you very much for
your time Mr Secretary.
56:01>> Okay, thank you, thank you.